The stimulus, Obama, and FDR
I, maybe us much as or more, than anyone wish that President Barack Obama would be more like FDR. But I also recognize there are disadvantages Obama has that FDR didn’t. Tow of which are smaller majorities in Congress, and less of a crisis than that of 1933. That being said I think two areas in particular where I fault Obama for not being like FDR, is that he hasn’t been as ever-present to the American people, showing them what he’s doing – day in and day out – to fix the economic situation. And second, he has not kept on reminding the American people how we got into this mess in the first place.
Obama has clearly failed on making sure everyone knows that the stimulus worked.
But in Washington stimulus has become the policy that dare not speak its name.
This wouldn’t be surprising if we were talking about a failed program. But, by any reasonable measure, the $800-billion stimulus package that Congress passed in the winter of 2009 was a clear, if limited, success. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that it reduced unemployment by somewhere between 0.8 and 1.7 per cent in recent months. Economists at various Wall Street houses suggest that it boosted G.D.P. by more than two per cent. And a recent study by Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder, economists from, respectively, Moody’s and Princeton, argues that, in the absence of the stimulus, unemployment would have risen above eleven per cent and that G.D.P. would have been almost half a trillion dollars lower. The weight of the evidence suggests that fiscal policy softened the impact of the recession, boosting demand, creating jobs, and helping the economy start growing again. What’s more, it did so without any of the negative effects that deficit spending can entail: interest rates remain at remarkably low levels, and government borrowing didn’t crowd out private investment.
Politically, however, none of this has made any difference. Polls show that a sizable majority of voters think that the stimulus either did nothing to help or actively hurt the economy, and most people say that they’re opposed to a new stimulus plan. The hostility has numerous sources. Many voters conflate the stimulus bill with the highly unpopular bailouts of the banking sector and the auto industry; Republicans have done a good job of encouraging such misconceptions, as when Representative Mike Pence, of Indiana, referred to the “bailout stimulus.” Also, the stimulus—which, to begin with, was too small to completely offset the economy’s precipitous drop in demand—was oversold. The Administration’s forecasts about the recession (particularly regarding job losses) were too optimistic, and so its promises about what the stimulus would accomplish set the public up for disappointment.
But the most interesting aspect of the stimulus’s image problems concern its design and implementation. Paradoxically, the very things that made the stimulus more effective economically may have made it less popular politically. For instance, because research has shown that lump-sum tax refunds get hoarded rather than spent, the government decided not to give individuals their tax cuts all at once, instead refunding a little on each paycheck. The tactic was successful at increasing consumer demand, but it had a big political cost: many voters never noticed that they were getting a tax cut. Similarly, a key part of the stimulus was the billions of dollars that went to state governments. This was crucial in helping the states avoid layoffs and spending cuts, but politically it didn’t get much notice, because it was the dog that didn’t bark—saving jobs just isn’t as conspicuous as creating them. Extending unemployment benefits was also an excellent use of stimulus funds, since that money tends to get spent immediately. But unless you were unemployed this wasn’t something you’d pay attention to.
And without the President and those in his administration being out thee everyday beating back the misinformation, the lies of his opponents have become the reality.
And that failure will make it harder to get the common sense fixes that our economy needs. (Hat tip to Economist’s View for these two links). We certainly need a second WPA to fix our infrastructure in the county, Obama should follow in FDR’s footsteps.
Indeed, Obama’s experience so far resembles FDR’s first uneven stabs at job creation. Roosevelt accepted the Democratic nomination in 1932 touting a plan to put a million men to work in national parks and forests. When he took office, with the unemployment rate at 24.9%, he created the Civilian Conservation Corps, his first jobs program.
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The lesson for Obama in all this is that stimulus works, and the sooner and more aggressive, the better. The vast infrastructure upgrades that were achieved by the WPA were in many ways a side-product, but an important one that is still paying national benefits. Given the country’s potholes, sagging bridges, rickety electric grid and spotty broadband coverage, a push today on new infrastructure would also provide lasting and necessary benefits. In the first round of stimulus spending, jobs were saved and some infrastructure projects got underway, but there’s still much more to do.
Of course, Obama faces challenges that his Depression-era predecessor didn’t. Roosevelt had stronger majorities in Congress. He could propose bold programs that required spending without risking gridlock or defeat. Nor did he inherit a culture of institutionalized deficits that stretched back 30 years, deficits that his opponents didn’t worry about when they wanted to fund wars and tax cuts but were quick to condemn when domestic spending was proposed. When Obama argues for a new round of stimulus, he’ll be standing against a distracting background of red ink.
Putting people back to work on infrastructure is a no-brainer, Building the Bridges to a Sustainable Recovery.
According to data compiled by the civil engineers’ society, planned spending across 15 categories of infrastructure, including aviation, drinking water systems, energy programs, levees, roads, schools and wastewater treatment, will fall short of needed investment by a cumulative total of more than $1.8 trillion in the next five years.
And periodic disasters — like Hurricane Katrina and the Interstate 35 bridge collapse in Minneapolis — have continued to remind us that we should not be neglecting these investments.
Deferring maintenance does nothing to alleviate our national indebtedness; in fact, it makes the problem far worse. According to the Nevada Department of Transportation, for instance, rehabilitation of a 10-mile section of I-80 that would cost $6 million this year would cost $30 million in two years, after the road deteriorated further.
If such a project is at all representative, spending an extra $100 billion nationwide on interstate highway maintenance now would reduce the national debt two years from now by several hundred billion dollars, relative to its level if no action were taken.
Some people object that infrastructure spending takes too long to roll out. But many projects could be started immediately. And remarkably low long-term interest rates imply that markets expect several more years of sluggish economic activity, so even projects that take a little longer would still be timely.
But won’t this extra spending make the deficit problem worse? A better question is this: Why is anyone worried about short-run deficits in the first place?
Deficits are a long-run problem. Every cent the government borrows must eventually be repaid with interest (or, equivalently, be carried at interest indefinitely), so it’s important to pay our bills. Although spending cuts will help, the retirement of millions of baby boomers will also make it necessary to increase revenue.
But not now. With consumer and investment spending remaining far below normal, the short-run imperative is to increase total spending by enough to put everyone back to work as quickly as possible.
While Obama and the Democrats may not have the majorities to get this done, it’s certainly something worth fighting for, and using as a campaign issue in the next two months.